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A Pragmatic View of Transfers
"in Contemplation of Death"
John E. Riecker*
He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he un-
covered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said: -
they were his last words-he said: Crito, I owe a cock to
Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall
be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no
answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement
was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were
set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth. PLATO, THE PHAEDO
("Death of Socrates," Jowett translation).
Not all transferors of property in contemplation of death can
rest as easily or as safely as did Socrates after sipping the draught
of hemlock. For no attorney attempting to give advice on inter
vivos gifts in connection with the drafting of a will or other
"estate planning" can avoid the sweep of section 2035 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 19541-the section which pulls back
into the donor's estate subject to tax all gifts made "in contem-
plation of death." In the writer's opinion this section has too
often paralyzed both attorney and client engaged in planning
the disposition of the latter's estate. Its very existence casts a
pall on all gifts inter vivos designed to minimize future testators'
taxable estates.
One can immediately imagine a middle-aged testator's jaws
dropping at the prospect of the Commissioner rescinding the tax
effects of his carefully-wrought lifetime gifts. We can speculate
on how rapidly the client indulges in quick mental calculations
on the state of his health, his age, his motives, and his nerves!
Stealthy but thorough marshalling of "life motives" often ensues,
and the harried subject emerges from the gift episode with a
shaky determination to live out the critical three-year period,
aloof from cars, busses, bad weather, air travel, and a high-serum
cholesterol! Personal physicians are often summoned to give
reassurance of glowing health, and the afflicted subject of such
* Member of the Michigan and California Bars. The writer is
indebted to I. Frank Harlow, Tax Counsel of The Dow Chemical Com-
pany, for his helpful criticism and suggestions.
1. Unless otherwise stated, all future references to Internal Reve-
nue Code sections in this article shall mean the 1954 statute. And all
references to the attorney drafting wills, trusts and other inter vivos
dispository instruments as an "estate planner," an "estate counselor,"
an "estate tax counselor," a "practitioner" and the like are not meant
as lay epithets or equivalents.
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estate planning rightfully rues the delays and procrastinations he
has put in the way of a visit to his lawyer's office.
It is the purpose of this article to show that administrative
and judicial enforcement of the "contemplation of death" rule
-section 2035--does not really justify such widespread taxpayer
alarm. It is herein urged that practicing attorneys in the field
of estate counseling will plan the disposition of their clients' es-
tates in spite of the possibility that any lifetime gifts of property
will be negated by the Commissioner's enforcement of section
2035. Most certainly there is nothing abhorrently evasive in such
planning! Draftsmen need only look for a predominant life
purpose behind the gifts of their clients and, if one is present
and provable, cause the dispository instruments to recognize and
embody such purpose.
To demonstrate this thesis, a brief but necessary history of
section 2035 of the Code will first be related. Second, after a re-
cital of the present law and regulations governing the sub-
ject, a number of different taxpayer motives will be listed which
have on occasion been held to rebut the applicable statutory pre-
sumption of estate taxability of such transfers. For example, it
will be shown that transfers within three years of death by a
donor, age 99,2 and by a donor age 90 who proved his vivacity by
clicking his heels together in mid-air,3 were held not in contem-
plation of death. Or, hardly less sensationally, that a donor only
81 was granted favorable tax treatment of an inter vivos transfer
of almost two million dollars little more than one year prior
to his death.4 Third, gifts between living persons of life insur-
ance policies will receive special mention because of the inher-
ently "testamentary" nature of this gift res. Fourth, and very
important, this article shall investigate how aggressive estate
planning can build a case against "contemplation of death" con-
notations by coupling the gift in question with the conferring of
a present interest in the donee; or by emphasizing the fact that
the donor actually did harbor a sufficiently separate, non-testa-
mentary motive for his transfer. We shall also discuss how
gifts held to have been made in contemplation of death are valued
in the donor's estate, and review helpful rules of trial procedure
in section 2035 cases. Finally, conjectural and proposed alterna-
tives to present estate taxation of such gifts will be offered.
This article is written for the practitioner by a practitioner.
2. Kniskern v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
3. Oliver Johnson, 10 T.C. 680 (1948).
4. Percy B. Eckhart, 33 B.T.A. 426 (1935).
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It cannot hope to be exhaustive of this extensively litigated sub-
ject. Limitless factual situations have caused a plethora of trial
determinations and, on the basis of the substantial evidence rule,
these have led to ready affirmations by higher courts. Rather
than simply catalogue this enormous range of judicial holdings,
this article hopefully will have a more selective thrust-that
of inculcating in the practitioner the need for the positive plan-
ning of gifts designed to withstand the challenge of section 2035
taxability and yet accomplish particular tax-saving purposes of
the donor. We shall attempt to avoid comment on the ethics
of this branch of estate taxation and limit our remarks to the
pragmatism of its enforcement.
I. STATUTORY HISTORY
Unlike the history of many other Code sections, the statu-
tory pattern behind the "contemplation of death" transfers has
been one of increasing liberality in favor of the taxpayer. Legis-
lation taxing such transfers first appeared in the Revenue
Act of 1916,6 at a time when 29 states imposed inheritance or
estate taxes on such gifts.1 This early statute created a re-
buttable presumption that gifts made within two years of a
donor's death were made in contemplation of death and were
thus taxable in his estate. Ten years later, by section 302 (c) of
the Revenue Act of 1926,8 Congress converted this rebuttable
presumption into one conclusive of the presumed fact. Then,
in the case of Heiner v. Donnan,9 the Supreme Court held that
such conclusive presumption of a death motive violated due
process of law and constituted an unreasonable legislative clas-
sification, with the result that the "rebuttable" presumption was
restored in 1932.10 The 1932 legislation, moreover, contained a
5. Those desiring a compendium of cases on "contemplation of
death" transfers are referred to: 1 A. CASNEP, ESTATE PLANNiNG 192
passim, (3d ed. 1961); 3 J. MARTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND
ESTATE TAXATION §§ 22.01 passim (1959); 1 R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION 239 (1942). See also Pavenstedt, The Limitation
of Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death by the Revenue Act
of 1950, 49 MlcH. L. REv. 839 (1951).
6. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777-78.
7. 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 5, at § 22.01 n.1. In Milliken v. Unit-
ed States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931), the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of taxing transfers under this section even though they had
been made prior to its enactment.
8. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70. See also
H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1925).
9. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
10. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 279.
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provision to the effect that all transfers within two years of the
donor's death of a material part of his estate were taxable as
part of his estate. We should note that gifts which took place
prior to the two-year period could also be questioned by the Com-
missioner-unaided, however, by any statutory presumption of
fact.
Such was the law until September 23, 1950. The Commis-
sioner was not only armed with a rebuttable presumption for
all gratuitous transfers within two years of death, but also could
use a scatter-gun technique on gifts many years prior to death.
Once an estate was challenged on the latter point, it had the
burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the incorrect-
ness of the Commissioner's determination." Thus ff a donor
managed to outlive the critical two-year period, he was still
only half-safe--it was possible, though of course not as likely,
that an older gift could be questioned.
By the Revenue Act of 195012 Congress removed the Commis-
sioner's scrutiny of gifts made prior to the "rebuttable" period,
installing instead a "conclusive" presumption that such older
transfers were not made in contemplation of the donor's death.
But the "rebuttable" period under which the donor's estate re-
tained the burden of proving a life motive was extended from
two to three years before death. Moreover, the pre-1950 require-
ment that the subject of the transfer must be a "material part"
of the donor's estate was stricken, meaning that a pre-death
gift, however small, could require the estate to come forward
with sustaining evidence. 3 It is submitted that the replacement
11. See Wishard v. United States, 143 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944),
where the challenged gift was completed seven years before donor's
death, and Blunt v. Commissioner, 41 F. Supp. 721 (D.N.J. 1941), afl'd,
131 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1942), where the period between the gift and
donor's death was nine years, both of which decisions found against the
Commissioner.
12. Ch. 994, § 501(a), 64 Stat. 962 [now INT. REv. CoDE of 1954,
§ 2035(b)].
Section 501 of your committee's bill removes from the scope of
the contemplation of death clause all transfers made more than
3 years prior to the date of death. On the other hand, the bur-
den of showing that the transfer was not in contemplation of
death will be borne by the estate in all cases where the transfer
was made within a period of 3 years ending with the date of
death. This will strengthen the position of the Government in
cases where the transfer occurred between two and three years
prior to the date of death.
H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1950).
13. Treasury Form 706 (revised Jan., 1966), Federal Estate Tax
Return, Schedule G, excludes from reporting requirements any such
gift of less than $1,000.00.
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of the "rebuttable" with the "conclusive" presumption against
estate inclusion was a far greater victory for the taxpayer than
was the one-year extension of the presumptive period a cor-
responding defeat.
It should be noted that while we have been speaking here of
"transfers" in contemplation of death, the language of section
2035 (b) of the Code is more inclusive:
If the decedent within a period of 3 years ending with the date
of his death (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth)
transferred an interest in property, relinquished a power, or
exercised or released a general power of appointment, such
transfer, relinquishment, exercise or release shall, unless shown
to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contempla-
tion of death .... 14
We shall see, however, that occasionally the exercise or relin-
quishment of a power within the three-year period may be in-
terpreted by the courts as the "perfection" of an earlier, safe
transfer and thus be sustainable as an integrated transaction not
in contemplation of death.
A review of the history of section 2035 has led one writer to
chronicle four different meanings which Congress and the courts
have conferred upon "contemplation of death" transfers:15
(1) Gifts causa mortis. These are so-called "death-bed"
transfers intended to be revocable if the donor survives.
Actually, such gifts are properly subsumed under section
2038 of the Code as transfers "to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death," and need not concern us here.
(2) Gifts made under threat or fear of imminent death.
This seems to have been the judicial interpretation of in-
cludability before the 1931 landmark decision of United
States v. Wells discussed below. 6
(3) Gifts made where death was not necessarily impending
or imminent but nevertheless constituted the "impelling
cause" of the donor's transfer. This was the Supreme
Court's standard in the Wells case and in United States v.
14. (Emphasis added). Section 2043 of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954
provides that where the transfer involved is made for "insufficient con-
sideration," there shall be included in the transferor's gross estate the
excess of the fair market value at the time of death over the value of
the consideration the decedent received at the time of the transfer.
15. Barry, The Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death,
10 HASTIMGs L.J. 370, 373-75 (1959).
16. 283 U.S. 102 (1931). See language of Treas. Reg. 37; Revenue
Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057. For pre-1931 rule see 3 J. MTmTws, supra
note 5, § 22.06, at 57 n.42.
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Allen.1'7 Present Treasury Regulations substantially reflect
this criterion.
(4) Gifts which are "a substitute for a testamentary disposi-
tion"--usually those benefiting the natural objects of the
donor's bounty and taking effect as of his death. This is a
somewhat more objective standard than (3) and shares
with the Wells standard considerable modern judicial cur-
rency.18
Since 1931, the Wells case has spawned countless court hold-
ings which collectively establish that the donor's general expec-
tation of death "in common with all mankind" is not enough to
cause estate taxability of the gift subject. In that trend-chang-
ing decision, the Supreme Court was faced with the full gamut of
conflicting circumstances which so often characterize an elderly
donor's lifetime transfers. The decedent donor, as early as 1901,
had advanced property to his children in order to see how they
handled the money, charging each of them with the amount of
the transfers. The transfers were made both before and after
the decedent drew his will. He was never seriously ill, but suf-
fered intermittently during the 30-year period spanning the
transfers from a condition diagnosed as "ulcerative colitis."
Though his will provided that the amount on his books at death
due from each child should be considered true advancements of
their respective intestate shares, he later made unconditional
transfers to the children which "evened them up." After being
pronounced cured of colitis, he died at age 73 of a nonmalignant
intestinal inflammation. The Court of Claims held all transfers
of the decedent not in contemplation of death.' 9
In its affirmance of this decision the Supreme Court used
some language destined for much repeated quotation:
The words "in contemplation of death" mean that the thought
of death is the impelling cause of the transfer, and while the
belief in the imminence of death may afford convincing evi-
dence, the statute is not to be limited, and its purpose thwarted,
by a rule of construction which in place of contemplation of
death makes the final criterion to be an apprehension that
death is "near at hand." If it is the thought of death, as a con-
trolling motive prompting the disposition of property, that af-
17. Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946); United States v. Wells,
283 U.S 102 (1931).
18. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Delaney, 69 F. Supp. 495
(D. Mass. 1947); Off v. United States, 35 F.2d 222 (S.D. ll. 1929) where
the execution of a will by the donee simultaneously with the inter
vivos transfers under scrutiny raised the question of a testamentary
intent. See also 3 J. MERTEs, supra note 5, at 22.06.
19. United States v. Wells, 39 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1930).
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fords the test, it follows that the statute does not embrace
gifts inter vivos which spring from a different motive.20
Such a "different motive," the Supreme Court ruled, was the im-
plementation of a long pattern of gifts during decedent's lifetime
in order to accomplish the purpose desirable to him if he contin-
ued to live.
Treasury regulations applicable to transfers in contempla-
tion of death say that a Wells-type transfer is "prompted by the
thought of death" if: (1) made with the purpose of avoiding
death taxes; or (2) made as a substitute for testamentary dis-
position; or (3) made for any other motive associated with
death.21 The present law and regulations thus make manifestly
clear that the evidentiary test of taxability of such transfers re-
duces to one of motive. Proof of predominant "life motive" for a
pre-death gift made within the statutory presumption period will
absolutely bar inclusion of the value of the gift res in the donor's
estate.22 The way is therefore open, even for the aged and infirm
donor, to carry out a lifetime transfer successfully against the
backdrop of a living, viable purpose and by a means which
confers a present benefit upon the donee. The importance here
of skillful diagnosis of donors' motives by competent counsel-
forewarned of the need for a predominant life motive-is obvious.
Before commenting on the methods available to the estate
practitioner seeking to build such sustainability into latter-day
inter vivos gifts, the writer would like to sample the great diver-
sity of taxpayer motives which have on occasion resulted in ex-
clusion of such gifts from the adjusted gross estate. Planning
counsel may take heart from some of the seemingly extreme ex-
amples to be cited. From the history of section 2035 just re-
viewed, the Wells case assuredly emerges as a supreme criterion
for present-day taxability of gifts in contemplation of death.
Yet that Court's opinion has been said to mean all things to
all people!23 The late and respected Randolph Paul noted, ".
20. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 118 (1931).
21. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1 (c) (1958).
22. This is almost exactly stated by the court in Lippincott v.
Commissioner, 72 F.2d 788 (3rd Cir. 1934). See also 3 J. MERTENS, supra
note 5, at § 22.43. Nor does the election of a husband to split gifts
made by him with his wife allow the wife to claim successfully-after
her spouse's decease-that at least her half of the gift should not be held
in contemplation of death. See English v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 12,526 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
23. See Barry, supra note 15, at 375. But it has been stated:
In the U.S. v. Wells case, the Government, in getting away from
the imminence of death concept, scored a substantial victory.
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too much should not be expected of the courts, for they are
presented in most cases with carefully assembled evidence in
proof of motive, which is a highly elusive, subjective test of
taxability. ' 24 Nevertheless, it is submitted that awareness of
the relative weight various courts have attached to more ob-
jective factors, such as age, health, timing of the decedent's will
with inter vivos gifts, percentage of gross estate given away,
needs of the donees, existence of a prior pattern of giving, and
avoidance of income or estate taxation, will serve as a guide
to the building of a case for exclusion of a challenged pre-death
gift.
II. FACTS COLORING THE DONOR'S TRANSFER
The following factual circumstances surrounding alleged
transfers in contemplation of death are given roughly in ascend-
ing order of importance. That is, the existence of facts con-
sistent with the suggested ideal under each subject heading be-
comes progressively more suggestive of a life motive and thus
moves the transfer further away from the factual presumption
that it was made in contemplation of death. The ranking is, of
course, open to question and rearrangement by the reader.
A. AGE OF DONOR AND INTERvAL BETvWEEN GIFT AND DEATH
The intimations of mortality naturally felt by elderly do-
nors most often are the foundation the Commissioner seeks for
estate taxation of inter vivos gifts under section 2035.25 Yet
transfers nine months before death by a 95-year old donor, and
within three years of death by a 99-year old person then in good
health, were cleared of the contemplation of death presump-
tion.26 Similarly, the gifts of an 87-year old just nine months
before death and of a 72-year old person one and one-half years
before death were not pulled back into the estate subject to
tax.27 All that can be said in these unusual cases is that a pre-
However, if the case is closely analysed upon its facts . . . the
scope of the Government's victory is substantially diminished.
3 J. MERTENS, supra note 5, § 22.30, at 110 n.45.
24. R. PAUL, supra note 5, at 279.
25. This state of facts most recently appeared in grounding the
holding in Ridgely v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 1220 (1967).
26. See Kniskern v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Fla. 1964);
Murphy v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. fI 12,244 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
27. See Studebaker v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 263 (N.D. Ind.
1962); Lockwood v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
See also cases reproduced in A. CmSNER, ESTATE PLANNrG--1965
SUPPLEMENT 124-25 (3d ed. 1965).
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vailing life motive tipped the balance in favor of the taxpayer.
For example, in Kniskern v. United States28 the gifts upheld were
not only prompted by the donor's prior exchange of stock which
resulted in dividends in excess of his needs, but also constituted
a relatively small percentage of his total estate and were a con-
tinuation of an established pattern of gifts to the donees in-
volved. Given such redeeming circumstances, the advanced age
of the donor and the proximity of his gifts to death were still
facts capable of rebuttal.
B. ILLNEss OF mm DONOR-AmD His KNOwLEDGE OF IT
VVhile a donor's actual state of health is certainly relevant to
a determination of whether his gift is in contemplation of his
death, his familiarity with the extent of his illness is even more
significant.2 9  Quite obviously, on the other hand, a person in
good health may make an exclusively testamentary-type trans-
fer.30 If motives associated with life are present in strength, the
mere suspicion that the donor knew of his fatal illness at the
time of the challenged gift is not enough to cause estate tax-
ability.31 Often the testimony of the donor's personal physician
or his psychiatrist and records of past hospitalization are ad-
missible for the bearing they may have on his mental dis-
position at the time of the gift in question.3 2 If an elderly but
active man who is accustomed to managing his own affairs
suddenly sheds large amounts of property by gift, the situation
points to an awareness of impending illness or death; whereas a
woman of equivalent age who has never been a "manager" of
her estate may divest herself of worldly goods simply because
their care and management is too great a responsibility for an
untutored investor.33
28. 232 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
29. See, e.g., Browarsky v. Granger, 148 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Pa.
1956); George A. Wheelock, 13 B.T.A. 828 (1928).
30. See Mary Lois K. McIntosh, 25 T.C. 794 (1956), aff'd, 248 F.2d
181 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 923 (1958), where the de-
cedent was quite openly attempting to avoid an inevitable future estate
tax liability.
31. Samuel Want, 29 T.C. 1223 (1958), rev'd and rem'd on other
grounds, Want v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1960).
32. Those readers interested in delving into the psychological mo-
tivation for gifts as affecting taxability in this area should see Ballan-
tine, Psychological Bases for Tax Liability, 27 HARV. Bus. REv. 200 (1949).
33. Compare Updike v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 807 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 301 U.S. 708 (1937) with Estate of Bertha Low, 2 T.C. 1114
(1943) and Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. IM. 1968).
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C. SIZE OF GIFT RELATIVE TO DONOR'S TOTAL ESTATE
A small gift transfer relative to the size of the donor's
adjusted gross estate has been held to indicate lack of an estate
tax avoidance motive.34 It should be remembered that former
statutory treatment of gifts in contemplation of death required
for estate taxability that the gift be a "material part" of the
donor's esate.35 Further, lack of a donor's "testamentary" intent
can often be read into a pre-death gift of relatively small sums.30
Yet here again some particular transfers have been held not
in contemplation of death regardless of the comparative amount
of assets transferred. Thus, decisions have upheld a living trans-
fer of 60 per cent of a 73-year old donor's estate,37 and of 40
per cent of an 83-year old donor's property33 where countervail-
ing life motives were proved. Just as in the case of old age,
the large relative size of the donor's planned gift should not
deter an estate counselor from at least exploring for so-called
"exculpatory" facts and motives and, if they are present in
strength, recommending the resolved gift.39
D. RELATIONSHIP OF DONEE TO DONOR
When the donor makes gifts during the presumptive pe-
riod to the natural objects of his bounty, his wife or children,
courts will often ascribe a testamentary motive to the transac-
tion. This judicial tendency is illustrated by City Bank Farmers
Trust Company v. McGowan,40 a 1945 Supreme Court decision.
There the donor was a mental incompetent and the subject of
probate court jurisdiction. His guardian had secured the court's
approval for transfer of assets from the ward's estate to his chil-
dren and also to some collateral heirs. It was held that the
gifts to the children were in contemplation of death, except to
the extent of $6,000.00 per annum which the ward had given
them each year when competent. However, as for the gifts to
collateral heirs, the Court found that a need existed and held
34. See Duncan v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 264 (D. Mass. 1957).
35. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803 (a), 47 Stat. 279.
36. See, e.g., Pyne v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 811 (Ct. Cl. 1959);
Black v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1946), affd, 164
F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947); Theodora Casey Topliffe, 39 B.T.A. 13 (1939).
37. Smith v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 397 (D. Mass. 1936).
38. Robert Wetherill, 36 B.T.A. 1259 (1937).
39. See, e.g., Mary W. Cushman, 40 B.T.A. 948 (1939), where the
donor gave away $794,000.00 in value, dying with an estate of merely
$6,000.00, yet the Board held the gift not in contemplation of death be-
cause of the presence of other life motives. See also 3 J. IM ERs,
supra note 5, at § 22.50.
40. 323 U.S. 594 (1945), affg in part and rev'g in part 142 F.2d
599 (2d Cir. 1944).
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that since the recipients were not direct heirs, no allowance to
them could be considered in lieu of their estate shares. These
gifts consequently were held not in contemplation of the donor's
death.
It is difficult to see a satisfactory evidentiary alternative to
this bald circumstance of relationship between donor and donee,
since a large percentage of inter vivos gifts are for the benefit of
natural, direct heirs. It would be just as logical, although not
nearly as likely, for the Commissioner to challenge a pre-death
gift to a charity or other exempt organization since the latter
too are often testamentary beneficiaries, though for different tax
reasons. Estate counselors must accept this affinity of many
gift recipients and attempt to plan around it.
E. EXISTENCE OF AN "OvERALL TESTAMENTARY" ScHEME
Another important factual circumstance surrounding gifts
inter vivos is their timing in relation to the donor's last will and
testament. Where the donor has created a living trust or made
direct gifts to his immediate family at or about the time he
executed his will, the gifts are naturally colored by the testa-
mentary context of the entire transaction.41 The Commissioner
and many courts will often simply assume that one's drawing of
a will indicates contemplation of death to the exclusion of other
collateral motives. Yet the execution of a will some time after
lifetime transfers have been made, even if such transfers con-
stituted little more than the advance payment of legacies, has
been held to exonerate the prior gifts from the contemplation of
death pull-back provisions of section 2035.42
F. THE TESTAMENTARY NATURE OF THE GiFT REs
A conveyance of property which the grantee can by no chance
use until the grantor's death, will so commonly be in the main
testamentary, that it is fair to infer that that was its prepon-
derating, if not indeed its only, purpose, unless there be af-
firmative evidence of other contributory motives.43
The concept of the vesting of presently enjoyable gifts in the
donee is an important one. A donor's gift of, for example, an
insurance policy on his life may be immediately suspect under
section 2035 because of the inherently testamentary nature of
the property given.44 However, other gift items can suggest the
41. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Delaney, 69 F. Supp. 495 (D.
Mass. 1947).
42. Ernest Hinds, 11 T.C. 314 (1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir.
1950); T.M. Flynn, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1287 (1944).
43. Garrett v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1950).
44. See Flick's Estate v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948),
1968]
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same pattern of enjoyment deferred by intent of the donor until
after death. In Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate,45 for example,
the donor created a trust eight years before death providing that
income was to be accumulated during his life, then to go to his
surviving wife for her life and on her death all principal to be
distributed to the donor's surviving children. Under the ap-
plicable pre-1950 rule, where the Commissioner could reach back
to question such transfers for a limitless prior period, the pre-
death transfers were found to be testamentary and thus in con-
templation of death. An estate design by which the children
would have received a present interest in the trust income during
the donor's remaining lifetime might have fared differently.
G. DONOR'S AVOIDANCE OF MANAGEMENT REsPONsIBniLTY
On our ascending scale, a donor's timorous purpose to avoid
"the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" quite often will
lead to a like avoidance of the clutches of section 2035 estate
inclusion. For example, a transfer induced by a motive of the
donor to keep his property free from his own speculative trans-
actions on the stock market has been held clearly associated with
life, and outside the ambit of contemplation of death transfers
subsumed under section 2035.46 An irrevocable insurance trust
for the benefit of donor's wife and children has also been in-
sulated from estate inclusion where it was created to protect
donor's family from the anticipated hazards of his business ac-
tivities.47 Similarly, a transfer of securities in trust made to
facilitate their investment by a competent trustee has been
recognized as constituting a living purpose.48 Even the rela-
tively defensive motive evidenced by a transfer of property into
rev'g 6 T.C.M. 72 (1947); Cronin v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir.
1947), rev'g 7 T.C. 1403 (1946); cf. Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 367
(3rd Cir. 1963). Insurance is so prominent a subject in contemplation
of death transfers that it will receive special mention elsewhere in this
article. See notes 101-108 infra, and accompanying text.
45. 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952), affg 14 T.C. 1263 (1950). For a
donor's motive of post-death assistance to a donee, see Burns v. Com-
missioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949).
46. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U.S. 23 (1938),
rev'g 95 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1938).
47. Wilbur B. Ruthrauff, 9 T.C. 418 (1947).
48. Mary W. Cushman, 40 B.T.A. 948 (1939); James C. Webster,
38 B.T.A. 273 (1938). A donor often wants to shift investment respon-
sibility to some more competent person or institution. See, e.g., Duncan
v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 264 (D. Mass. 1957). Indeed, the intended




trust beyond the reach of so-called unscrupulous advisors has
been held to exhibit a predominantly living purpose.49
H. TRANSFERS TO ASSIST THE DoNEE IN AN IMvEDIATE NEED
A donor may not only harbor a "defensive" motive in trans-
ferring property beyond the reach of himself or others; much
more often he may want actively to help the intended donee in a
given immediate need or purpose. Thus, where a donor within
three years of his death transferred to four of his children either
residential lots or cash to enable each of them to build or pur-
chase a home, it was held that the transfer satisfied living, spe-
cific needs and was excludable from the donor's estate.50 Gifts
have likewise been upheld as exclusions from an adjusted gross
estate where they were made to give the donor's sons business
experience, 5' or to give a donee opportunity to take part in man-
agement of the donor's investments. 52  Nor is the particular
morality of donor's motive or the worthiness of the need satis-
fied by the gift given much weight. A gift was upheld where
the so-called living purpose was to allow an extravagant daugh-
ter the home she longed for,53 and to provide for two sons who
were alcoholics and narcotics users.54 Even a gift evincing the
donor's elliptically fatalistic motive to help his relatives "...
while he was living so that they would not sit around waiting for
him to die. . ." resulted in a determination against contemplation
of death imputation. 5
Gifts of a more general purpose-to help the donee become
"financially independent" or to instill notions of thrift-are also
recognized as indicating a motive associated with life.56 Not so,
however, with lifetime gifts where the donor is quite plainly try-
ing to shirk a legal or moral responsibility which would other-
wise attach on his death. In the Sixth Circuit case of Kroger v.
Commissioner,7 the court conceded that the decedent had made
49. Blunt v. Commissioner, 41 F. Supp. 721 (D.N.J. 1941).
50. Boyd v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 242 (D. Ky. 1961).
51. Blakeslee v. Smith, 26 F. Supp. 28 (D. Conn. 1939), aff'd, 110
F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1940).
52. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ala.
1939).
53. John Moir, 47 B.T.A. 765 (1942).
54. David Little, 1941 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 41,207.
55. Pyne v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 399, 410-11 (1959).
56. See Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 630 (1946); Becker v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935). See also Des Portes v. United
States, 171 F. Supp. 598 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
57. 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 866 (1945).
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pre-death gifts of one million dollars to each of his children from
a desire to give them the obvious advantage of these benefits
during his lifetime. But in marked contrast, a trust the dece-
dent had drawn up just before his second marriage in which he
reserved income to himself for life, then to the children of his
first marriage, with corpus finally distributable to his grand-
children, was held to have been created with the dominant mo-
tive of barring his future (and younger) wife from any dower
rights. Finding also that the children took no "present" interest
in the trust, at least during the decedent's life, the court held
that it was created in contemplation of the decedent's death.
I. TRANSFERS SATISFYING LEGAL OR MORAL OBLIGATIONS
While courts look askance at gifts intended to circumvent
legal obligations of the donor, what about the "life-like" char-
acter of those which are intended to meet such responsibilities?
Are these considered at all "testamentary" in motive or pur-
pose? The Court of Claims has held not. In Hoover v. United
States58 the decedent, a widow, made substantial gifts to her
four children prior to her death because their deceased father
had made promises to them which he had never kept. The court
found a life motive in the widow's feeling of obligation even
though the death of another-her husband-was the real cause
of the gift. Gifts between living persons in pursuance of a previ-
ous promise from one to the other can be said to "relate back" in
time to the earlier promise or obligation. Mertens states that
"cases involving fulfillment of a previous single 'plan' or prom-
ise, as distinguished from a periodic series of repeated gifts, have
been treated very generously by the courts."'5 9
Where an earlier plan or promise of the donor can be shown
to exist, an illness or other morbid occurrence which intervenes
between such promise and the actual date of the gift may be
held to be immaterial. The independent significance of a prior
event, such as a living and provable commitment by the donor,
has such pervasive strength that it has been held to give "life"
character to a transfer made one day before death.60
58. 180 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
59. 3 J. MERTENS, TtE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 22.29, at 105 (1959); See Amy H. DuPuy, 9 T.C. 276 (1947), where
decedent's forgiveness of her surviving husband's debt was planned by
her long before her actual gift inter vivos.
60. Edith Huggard Sharp, 30 B.T.A. 532 (1934), 33 B.T.A. 290,
ah'd, 91 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1937).
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J. PROTECTION OF INTERESTS IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
Estate planners frequently recommend present gifts of un-
listed, closely held stock in relatively unmarketable family cor-
porations. The well known inflationary divergence of appraisers'
opinions of the value of such interests in a decedent's estate,
alleviated only partially by the stock redemption provisions of
Code section 303 and the estate tax installment payment op-
tion under section 6166, results in attempts to sprinkle out such
interests in anticipation of death to one's family or business as-
sociates. "Gift-sales" of closely held stock, the price being the
donor's cost basis, are also prevalent and provide the donor's
future estate with a modicum of cash liquidity to meet expected
death taxes. The question here is whether the very nature of the
gift res-that of a proprietary corporate stock interest-suggests
a contemplation of death motive.
It is submitted that motives of independent living significance
capable of withstanding the Commissioner's contention regard-
ing taxability are not too difficult to discover in this area.
For example, a gift of such stock by an 82-year old donor one
day after suffering a severe heart attack, made for the express
purpose of stabilizing family control of a corporation, was held
not in contemplation of death."1 And where a decedent had
transferred a 50 per cent interest in each of two corporations
to his son with the desire not only that his son have a financial
interest in the business but also that this constitute appreciation
for the latter's willingness to undertake the attendant respon-
sibility, the court was quick to find a living motive in the gift.62
K. DONOR'S DESIRE TO Avom FUTURE TAXES
It has been held that a transfer motivated predominantly by
the donor's desire to avoid estate taxes indicates that the thought
of death was uppermost in the donor's mind.63 Contrarily,
where the donor's avoidance motive is directed at the federal
tax on income, a life motive is generally imputed.64 But this
61. Brigid Angela Casey, 25 T.C. 707 (1956).
62. Belyea v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1953). Decedent
subsequently had made annual gifts to the son, mostly within the limits
of the gift tax exclusion. See also Baxter v. United States, 68-2 U.S.
Tax. Cas. 12,546 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
63. Mary Lois K. McIntosh, 25 T.C. 794 (1956), affd, 248 F.2d 181
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 923 (1958). The donor was in
excellent health at the time of the gift.
64. See Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.
1938) (dictum), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 648 (1939). "A desire to avoid or
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distinction has a large penumbral area. In Denniston v. Com-
missioner 5 a federal circuit court held that, particularly in a
young and vigorous donor, the sole motive to avoid estate taxes
is not of sufficient strength to characterize the transaction as
one in contemplation of death, for a decrease in estate taxes is
an inevitable concomitant of any successful estate planning.
The root question the courts face is how to separate a par-
ticular planned gift having the inevitable result of estate tax-
saving from one undertaken with that predominant motive. Fac-
tual circumstances of varying intensities will color and tint the
subject gift on one or the other side of the crucial line. The
only rule which can be safely stated is that, given a sustaining
"life" purpose for the gift, the fact that the gift does reduce es-
tate taxes will be ignored. Thus in Lockwood v. United States6
the attorney for the decedent's estate was able to show that an
estate tax-saving codicil drawn at the same time as the ques-
tioned gift inter vivos was the "general practice" of most area
draftsmen. Consequently, such clause was held not to detract
from the testator's otherwise provable life motives in making
the gift.
L. PATTERN OF DONOR'S PRIOR GIS AND His DIsPosiTORY
INSTRUMENTS
A donor may frequently be so attuned to the relative ad-
vantage of incurring gift rather than estate taxes that he makes
regular, annual gifts to his wife and/or children. A prior and
consistent pattern such as this will often protect later gifts
which may be attacked as having been made in contemplation
of death-provided the later transfers do not deviate conspicu-
ously from the prior pattern.67 Gift habits which extend back
into a donor's younger, healthier, more penurious years are as
important in this respect as all other life-sustaining motives and
tend to characterize later transfers as a "continuation" of a
decrease federal income taxes is clearly a motive associated with life,
even though no income is distributable until after the donor's death."
3 J. MERTENS, supra note 59, § 22.20, at 90.
65. 106 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1939). Compare Peter Rasmussen, 20
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1694 (1962) with Lockwood v. United States, 181 F.
Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), for a contrast between judicial treatment of
gifts purporting to avoid estate taxes and those avoiding taxes on income.
66. 181 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
67. See Florence M. Harrison, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 776 (1958) in
which transfers by donor at age 93, five months prior to her death, were




consistent, uninterrupted plan or policy.68
The existence of such a pattern was judicially recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in City Bank Farmers Trust
Company v. McGowan,69 where the only part of a large inter
vivos gift upheld by the Court was the $6,000 portion the do-
nor had customarily given his children each preceding year.
Many times courts will resolve the motivational fact issue against
the taxpayer if the evidence fails to show a regular pattern of
lifetime gifts. Thus, recently in Ridgely v. United States,70 the
isolated fact that the donor had made some prior gifts was not
enough to avoid estate inclusion of the instant transfer; the court
failed to find an "established" or "well considered" plan in such
gifts.
Any practitioner drafting a client's will ought to be forever
conscious of the importance of "pattern." When a future testa-
tor unfolds the details of his estate and his past lifetime gifts,
whether outright or in trust, the opportunity is presented to the
attorney to relate and integrate these with the proposed estate
plan. The more pervasive the attorney's original concept of
estate tax minimization for his client, the clearer will be the
successive steps the client takes in future years to implement
such concept; all of which will tend to relate back to the
beginning of the plan.
The sampling just undertaken of the more objective facts
surrounding a donor's inter vivos gifts within the section 2035
presumptive period could run on and on. We have attempted to
organize a list of fact situations in order of their ascending utility
for winning exclusion from the operation of the Code's contem-
plation of death provisions. Thus, establishing a prior pattern
of lifetime transfers will more successfully meet the Commis-
sioner's challenge than will proof of the donor's young age and
good health. Yet not one of the single classifications, standing
alone, is completely determinative of the ultimate fact whether
the donor was motivated by contemplation of his death.
68. See Belyea v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1953);
Adolph J. Koch, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 898 (1943), affd, 146 F.2d 259
(9th Cir. 1944); Alice B. Davis, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 476 (1943), affd,
142 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1944).
69. 323 U.S. 594 (1945), af-f'g in part and rev'g in part 142, F.2d
599 (2d Cir. 1944).
70. 180 Ct. Cl. 1220 (1967).
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III. ESTATE PLANNING AROUND "CONTEMPLATION
OF DEATH" TRANSFERS
Having looked backward into the allowances courts have
made for a donor's life motives in making gifts, we now must
synthesize these rules and opinions into a workable procedure on
a kinetic level for the practitioner facing his subject client and
charged with the responsibility of evolving a viable estate
plan. The objective is to recommend lifetime transfers which
will result in lowering the client's estate tax and to anticipate
future threats of section 2035 inclusion in his taxable estate. The
writer believes that from the recited life-associated acts and cir-
cumstances under which a donor makes gifts, three primary ob-
jectives become clear.71 As a general matter, the transfer should
have a "pragmatic" effect, meaning that it has practical conse-
quences or values. The donor's gift should do something in
the "here and now" and its motive must have an "independent
significance" from death or from a tax occasioned by death.72
The following discussion will center around the timing of the
gifts, the creation of a lifetime gift pattern and creation of a
present interest in the donee-the three considerations which
best focus upon the desired "pragmatism."
A. RELATIVE TnvmqG oF DONOR'S LiTnvA GIFs wiTH His
LAST WILL An TESTAMENT
It has already been shown how inter vivos gifts executed
simultaneously with the donor's last will and testament arouse
testamentary suspicion whereas no such inference may be drawn
if the gifts have preceded the will in time.73  Even if the do-
nor prepares a lifetime trust by an instrument separate and
distinct from his will, simultaneous execution of the will con-
taining similar or complementary provisions will often give the
entire transaction a testamentary character.74
In Igieheart v. Commissioner75 the decedent at age 74 had
71. See Polen, In Contemplation of Death, 104 T. & E. 777 (1965)
for a similar synthesis.
72. The writer is perhaps unduly fond of the term "independent
significance," a concept borrowed from, inter alia, one of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule in the law of evidence. It is used in this article to
mean a motive or purpose "standing on its own" and negating a sole
motive of death anticipation.
73. See Garrett v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950); Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Delaney, 69 F. Supp. 495 (D. Mass. 1947).
74. Commissioner v. Gidwitz, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952).
75. 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935).
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created two substantial trusts for his family, one irrevocable,
the other revocable. At the time his general health and outlook
on life was good, and he had just received a large amount of
income from the sale of his business-both circumstances ordi-
narily favorable toward a life-associated transfer. The donor
had an impressive grouping of reasons for these transfers: he
wished to make his wife financially independent and to teach
her skills of property management; he wanted some of his prop-
erty in the hands of a competent investor; and he hoped to
reduce his income taxes. Alas, these motives were of no avail!
Coming within the two-year presumptive statute,76 the transfer
was held in contemplation of death by the court, which found:
(1) that the donor had no pre-existing policy of such gifts, (2)
that his will was executed simultaneously with the trusts, and (3)
that the wife was named executrix of the will, thus any invest-
ment training she received from trust management would inure
to the benefit of the donor's estate as well.
In Wishard v. United States, 77 the donor's will was executed
six years after the gift of an annuity contract to his wife and
sister, and contained provisions dissimilar to the annuity. This
was a salient factor in the court's finding that the gift of the
annuity was not in contemplation of the donor's death.78
In practice it is even better for the donor's will to precede
the creation of a lifetime trust than to be executed simultane-
ously with it. In the Supreme Court case of Colorado National
Bank v. Commissioner,"9 the decedent had created a large irre-
vocable trust for his descendants two years after executing
his will. In the Court's view, the will, executed before the
trust and itself providing a testamentary trust for the children,
provided support for the finding of an overall motive of the
donor not directly springing from apprehension of death.
It is thus clear that if the living gift is independent in time
from the donor's will, the donor's estate has an additional
point of reference for the finding of a life motive when chal-
lenged by the Commissioner.80  However, a question may be
76. Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 9.
77. 143 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944).
78. The case was decided under the pre-1950 regulations where the
Commissioner could challenge any previous transfer of the decedent-
no matter how remote in time-as having been made in contemplation
of death.
79. 305 U.S. 23 (1938).
80. See, e.g., Ernest Hinds, 11 T.C. 314 (1948), affd, 180 F.2d 930
(5th Cir. 1950); T.M. Flynn, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1287 (1944).
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raised concerning the familiar life insurance or other revocable
trust and pour-over will combination which is common in the
planning of estates of young professional persons and corporate
executives. Such a device is a simultaneous execution of dis-
positary instruments and would thereby appear to be subject to
adverse future holdings on the issue of contemplation of death.
Yet, the creation of such a revocable trust is not really an
independent act having any estate tax benefit; rather it is pre-
dominantly a strategem to avoid future probate administration
of the trust assets and some state inheritance taxes. Since by
the very nature of the revocable trust the settlor's transfer is
incomplete, it cannot even qualify for adjudication under section
2035.81 The transfer, so far as section 2035 is concerned, is iden-
tical to a testamentary bequest or devise. Only if the settlor
later amends the trust to provide for irrevocability is the origi-
nal transfer subject to consideration as having been made in
contemplation of death. The question then becomes, "Does the
'amendment' update the trust so that it no longer is an integral
part of the will transaction?"
While there is a paucity of case authority on the point, it is
submitted that an additional transfer to the corpus of such a
revocable trust-made at the same time it is amended to be
irrevocable-would be a transfer of "independent significance"8 2
not tainted by the fact that the donor had previously executed
his will simultaneously with the creation of the revocable trust.
However, even without such an additional transfer one might
well ask whether the amendment to irrevocability alone is not
enough to confer such independence. It is believed that it is
sufficient if positive proof of a life motive for the donor's amend-
ment is offered.
In the landmark case of Allen v. Trust Company,8 3 the de-
cedent, in 1925, had created two spendthrift trusts for his son and
daughter to assure their future well-being. In 1934, he enlarged
the trusts but retained his original power to amend them. The
decedent, a lawyer, obviously believed that the trusts were com-
plete gifts at the time, for he had paid a gift tax on them. He also
believed that his reservation of the power to amend with the
consent of the trust beneficiaries would not cause inclusion of
the trust assets in his estate. In 1937, after learning of the
81. Only completed or irrevocable transfers are contemplated by
section 2035. 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 59, at § 22.04.
82. See note 72 supra.
83. 326 U.S. 630 (1946).
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Supreme Court's adverse decision in Helvering v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Company,8 4 he released his amendment power in
order to put the trust in the "completed gift" position he had
originally intended and to conform to the new holding. As
circumstances would have it, his release occurred within two
years of his death. The Supreme Court held that his release
related back to the 1925 and 1934 transfers, saying: "This is
not a case where a settlor, having made one plan for the dis-
position of his property, later makes a different one to avoid
death taxes."85  The settlor had not given additional property
in 1937; all he had done was perfect legally an earlier, planned
transfer, and by such act he hoped to carry out his original in-
tention. The 1937 release was thus "integrated back" to the
1925 date of the trust's creation and was thereby protected from
"contemplation of death" treatment.86
In addition, in the familiar case of a pour-over will and life
insurance trust, the donor often initially names the trust as a pri-
mary beneficiary of his policies and retains the incidents of own-
ership in himself. If at some later time he amends the "dry"
trust to irrevocability, and also assigns to the trust the incidents
of ownership of the policies, the transaction becomes independent
in time from his pour-over will. Such amendments often
follow several years after the origination of a revocable trust,
depending upon the increasing affluence of the settlor and his
growing conviction in the utility of the trust and the compe-
tence of its administration.
B. CREATION OF A POSITIVE, CONSlSTENT ANI ENDURING PLAN OF
GIFTs BY Tim DONOR
The creation of a consistent "plan" of inter vivos transfers
apart from the donor's last will and testament is another facet
of estate planning in apprehension of the Commissioner's im-
position of section 2035. There is a gradation of donor's mo-
tives here which we might note in passing. For example, evi-
dence of a past "promise" of the donor would not as strongly
indicate life-associated motives as would evidence of certain re-
peated or successive gifts. And repeated gifts would not have as
great evidentiary weight as a previously conceived and partially
84. 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
85. 326 U.S. 630, 636 (1946).
86. See Daniel W. Wardwell, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1530 (1961).
See also Chris M. Neilson, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1086 (1967) (conver-




executed plan of transfer.8 7 The habitual regularity of a donor's
gifts pinned to Christmas giving,88 and even simple evidence of
regular gifts to a donor's children over a lengthy period, has vin-
dicated the donor's life motives and resulted in estate exclusion.8 9
But habit or regularity in giving is not nearly as strong a reve-
lation of a donor's life motive as is a gift made to perfect or
protect a previously conceived plan. When the latter subjective
element is added to the more objective physical pattern of the
gifts a case for estate exclusion is difficult for courts to deny.
Where there is a causal connection between the challenged
transfer and an earlier plan, design or general purpose, the gift
can be treated as if it took place prior to the three-year pre-
sumptive period. The decedent in Joseph Giuliani,90 a mere five
months before 1Wis death, transferred business property to his son
as a gift. The transfer was held not in contemplation of death
because it was shown that it resulted from a plan for the vest-
ing of such interest which decedent had proposed ten years ear-
lier. Similarly, in Brown v. Commissioner91 a transfer made
within three months of the decedent's death but pursuant to a
plan formed 20 years before, when the decedent was in rugged
good health, was held non-testamentary and not includable in
his estate.92
Many clients coming before attorneys for estate planning
or counselling can marshal together at least some gifts they
have previously made to family members. If so, the attorney
should try to weave these gifts into a synthesized future pattern
-perhaps by a continuation of the client's same past practice,
perhaps by the creation of an irrevocable living trust for the
same beneficiaries in which the settlor explicitly recites his past
gifts and adds that he now wishes professional investment
counsel for future funds. The addition of such precatory lan-
87. This gradation or continuum of increasing intensity is more
fully developed in 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 59, at § 22.29 passim.
88. See Black v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1946),
aff'd, 164 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947).
89. See Routzahn v. Brown, 95 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1938); Florence
M. Harrison, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 776 (1958).
90. 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 673 (1952).
91. 74 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1934). See also Edith Huggard Sharp,
30 B.T.A. 532 (1934), 33 B.T.A. 290, affd, 91 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1937),
where the challenged transfer was made within one day of death but
the preparation of the trust instruments of transfer had been under way
for several years.
92. Smaller, earlier gifts of the donor may even protect larger,
later ones where a sufficient causal connection is shown via an iden-
tifiable plan. See Belyea v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1953).
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gauge indicating a "wish" or "desire" of the donor, while not
legally binding upon the trustee, certainly loses nothing in a
later argument as to the donor's motive. Even though, as we
have seen, 3 almost any assembled proof of a donor's life motive
is bound to be regarded as self-serving, nothing is lost by em-
bodying the donor's purpose in the dispository instrument it-
self.0 4
If one's client is more fortunate and can show not only a
past practice of gifts but also some consistent thread of purpose
or plan in what has preceded, the planner's job is made even
easier. One obvious example of such a lifetime plan involves the
desire of many donors to preserve control of a closely-held fam-
ily enterprise in their descendants or their trusted associates.
For example, the creation of an irrevocable trust with a corpus
of closely-held corporation stock benefiting minor sons of the
settlor, with business associates of the donor as trustees, impli-
citly would seem to spell out a life motive of continuity of
management of the business.95 Given this founding purpose,
all later gifts to the trust until the children reach the age for
distribution would seem safe. If the donor's children are of
age and inclined to carry on the business, a gift motive express-
ing the desire for such preservation builds yet a sharper case
for estate exclusion.
So, too, a gift to an interested child by a farmer or rancher
of the land, buildings, stock or equipment of a farm enter-
prise demonstrates a desire that the family unit carry on the
business already established. Yet demonstration of a plan or
purpose need not be limited to family businesses. Gifts to
aid children in professions can be tailored and patterned by
an initial gift of an interest in, say, an office building, at first a
fractional interest or a life estate and later perhaps a remainder
release, depending upon the donor's gift tax lifetime exemption
93. See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
94. Courts sometimes pay no attention to recitals of this type in a
donor's will or trust, or even in a gift tax return. In Campbell v.
Kavanagh, 114 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Mich. 1953), the donor's prepared
gift tax return contained the statement: "motive-to avoid future in-
heritance taxes." The court, in its benificent wisdom, held the gift not
in contemplation of death, remarking: "... . we are forced to the con-
clusion that this man's gift became the unintended target of a public
accountant's enthusiasm with misapprehension of the law. That is all."
See also Bertha Engel, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 70 (1947).
95. Often a nonvoting common or preferred stock issue is created
and given to the child directly or through the Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act in force in most states. However, the lack of voting control may
hint at the lack of a "present" interest conferred upon the donee.
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or his ability to finance a gift tax. Again, a substantive motive
expressing such a purpose initially will serve to characterize
later gifts close to death made in the same medium.
C. CREATION OF A PRESENT INTEREST IN THE DONEE
In this subsection we are not concerned with direct or out-
right gifts to a donee, for those obviously create a present living
interest in the gift res. It is the more sophisticated method of
transfer by an accumulation trust or trust designed to skip a
generation of donees in the interest of saving two or more suc-
cessive estate taxes which most often comes under section 2035
scrutiny. Often in his effort to construct such an elaborate
mechanism for insulating successive generations from estate tax,
a draftsman will overlook the fact that the failure of the transfer
to confer a present interest in an immediate donee may be con-
strued as a "testamentary" feature of the transfer and thus
bring down a tax as a gift in contemplation of death.
The importance of vesting present interests in intended gift
recipients is illustrated by Commissioner v. Gidwitz.96 In that
case, the decedent had made a transfer in trust eight years before
his death, under which no benefits were payable to the trust
beneficiaries until his death. Income was to be accumulated dur-
ing the settlor's life and the beneficiaries expressly were pre-
vented from alienating their expectancy. The decedent and
his wife were named trustees. Presumably, however, their du-
ties were limited to those of a fiduciary nature. The court
found that the Tax Court's decision affirming treatment of the
transfer as made in contemplation of death was not clearly er-
roneous.9 7 We could assume that either the vesting of an income
interest in the Gidwitz donees for the life of the donor or the
elimination of the trust's spendthrift clause would have ma-
terially changed the court's opinion. As it was, the failure of
the settlor to convey a present interest was fatal.
A "present interest" can be read into any irrevocable living
trust in which the settlor is "trustful" enough to allow the
beneficiaries a present income interest and, even better, a power
of principal invasion either with ascertainable standards or gov-
erned by the five per cent or $5,000 standard allowed by sec-
96. 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952).
97. The court was also aided by the fact that the decedent had
executed a will with similar provisions at the same time as the trust in




tion 2041 of the Code.98  When the facts are evenly balanced
between a life or death motive of the donor in creating the trust
and making the initial transfer, this single "present interest"
feature may tip the scales in the taxpayer's favor.
Instead of waiting until the drafting of a last will and testa-
ment to become "trust conscious," the testator might create an
irrevocable, living, residuary trust in advance of his will-and
similar to the "residuary" or "Trust B" provisions of a marital
share formula will. By vesting a present income interest in the
trust beneficiaries, the settlor would have two strings to his bow
in future combat with the Commissioner. Not only would he
have established a living motive by benefiting an immediate
donee presently, he would also have spared his transfer from
the "contemplation of death" taint of a simultaneous will. When
the will is finally drawn, it could pour over its residuary share
into the existing trust rather than into a testamentary-type
"Trust B."
This emphasis on the importance of a present interest as a
gift res suggests another popular estate planning device-the
ten-year income trust.99 Here, a present, usable interest is con-
veyed to the donee, who must report the income therefrom on
his own federal income tax return until either the corpus re-
verts to the donor at the end of the trust's term or until the
donor's earlier death. Should the donor die within the ten-year
period-or indeed within the three years following the execution
of the trust-only the actuarial value of the outstanding term in-
come interest would be subject to section 2035 treatment as a
gift in contemplation of death. Could the Commissioner claim
the whole property as the "interest" transferred under section
2035? This question anticipates a later discussion. 0 0
We have in the preceding analysis suggested to the practi-
tioner three considerations in planning lifetime gifts which
may withstand their attack as gifts in contemplation of death.
To be sure, this delineation is not mutually exclusive; the timing
of a lifetime gift vis-A-vis the donor's last will and testament
may also involve or refer to a previous pattern of such gifts.
98. INT. R V. CODE of 1954, § 2041, permits an absolute, non-cumu-
lative invasion power by the donee of five per cent of the trust corpus or
$5,000, whichever is the greater, exercisable per annum, without subject-
ing the balance of the trust corpus to tax in the donee's estate.
99. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 673, for the mechanics of this
trust, which is basically an income tax-saving device. The settlor un-
der this section must also have a life expectancy of ten years or more.
100. See notes 109-128 infra, and accompanying text.
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And each gift in the pattern may have been of a "present inter-
est" in the gift res. The practitioner who keeps the necessity of
all three elements in mind will be the most successful in sal-
vaging lifetime dispositions from later estate taxation. And his
clients, particularly his elderly, infirm, and apprehensive clients,
will better be able to assess the risks of such taxation.
Before looking at some of the valuation of gifts in contem-
plation of death difficulties, it is necessary briefly to analyze
transfers of insurance. This seeming digression is dictated not
only by the peculiarly testamentary nature of a life insurance
policy but also by the increasing popularity of insurance policy
transfers in typical estate planning procedures.
IV. LIFE INSURANCE AS A SPECIAL SUBJECT OF INTER
VIVOS TRANSFERS
It has already been noted that a donor's transfer of a life
insurance policy is often characterized as contemplative of death
because of the "inherently testamentary" nature of the gift
res.1° 1 One authority remarks that
... insurance fits rather snugly into testamentary patterns and
where there is no present need of the transferee and no other
material reason for the timing of the transfer of the policies it
is difficult to avoid the normal conclusion that thought of death
and its aftermath prompted decedent's acts, regardless of his
age, health or activities.102
A classic case tending to confhm this view is Vanderlip v.
Commissioner.10 3 Long before her death the decedent had pur-
chased life insurance policies aggregating one million dollars,
upon which she borrowed all the insurers would lend. Fourteen
years later she irrevocably assigned all the policies to four trus-
tees to hold until they became payable on her death, thereafter
to continue to hold the policies as a trust fund for her heirs.
The trustees were given power to use the policy dividends to pay
premiums and also interest on the insured's loans; they could
even borrow on the policies for this purpose. Nevertheless, dur-
ing the remainder of her life the insured was forced to supple-
ment heavily the premium payments to keep the policy loans
current. The court held that the insured's donees did not enjoy
101. See Sloan v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1948); Empire
Trust Co. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); George P.
Rhodes, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 174 (1947), affd, 174 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.
1949).
102. 3 J. MERTENs, supra note 59, § 22.41, at 145.
103. 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 728 (1946).
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the gift res until her death and that her motive in the trans-
action was to avoid estate taxes. The policy gifts were found to
be merely a substitute for a bequest, and though the donor-
insured died five years after the assignment in trust, her supple-
mental cash contributions were held to "taint" the entire trans-
action as one in contemplation of death. The holding is an un-
usual example of how a donor's earlier "plan" unfortunately was
"pulled forward" or integrated with later transfers within the
presumptive period-to cause estate taxation.
The Vanderlip transfer failed because the donees did not re-
ceive a present interest. A similar situation was found to exist
in Davidson v. Commissioner.0 4 There the decedent irrevocably
assigned all her interest in certain life insurance policies in
trust in 1937, directing the trustee to collect the proceeds on her
death (which occurred in 1941) and distribute same for the bene-
fit of named relatives. The trustee was also directed to use the
proceeds to purchase assets from the donor's estate in order to
pay off certain remainders due under her husband's will. The
donor executed her will in favor of the same beneficiaries at
the time she created the insurance trust. The court held that
the insurance trust was created in contemplation of the grant-
or's death, stating:
Viewed in their entirety, it is not difficult to consider the will
and the trust instruments as integrated parts of a single plan,
testamentary in nature, for the disposition of decedent's estate
to take effect at her death.... Nothing was accomplished by
the trust instrument that could not have been done in the same
way and to the same extent by the will.105
Yet where a present interest or a present obligation has been
conveyed to the recipient along with the donated life insurance
policy, courts have found that the transfer is not testamentary in
nature. For example, in Cronin v. Commissioner,10 6 the donor
assigned ownership of his life insurance policies to his wife and
the wife thereafter paid the premiums. There was corrobora-
tive evidence that the donor's corporation faced a trying period
with creditors at the time of the transfer. The court looked be-
yond the testamentary nature of the policies given and re-
fused to include the gift in the donor's estate, finding that the
donee of the policies had a sufficient life interest in the gift res.
The donor was found to have intended the donee to exercise
forthwith all rights inherent in the policies other than the right
104. 158 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1946).
105. Id. at 243.
106. 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947).
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to collect the policy proceeds on the donor's death.1 0 7
Ownership rights in an insurance policy could include the
power of the donee to change beneficiaries, to borrow on the cash
value of the policy, or to exercise the various policy options.
It is submitted that, regardless of the donee's rights under law
with reference to these incidents of ownership, the explicit and
perhaps even redundant enumeration of them in a well-drafted
trust instrument can be an important factor in bolstering the
alleged living motive of the donor. Careful draftsmen would thus
do well to spell out in the trust instrument the powers of the
policy and the incidents of ownership so conferred upon the
donee.108
V. VALUATION OF INTERESTS CONVEYED IN
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
A discussion of taxation of gifts in contemplation of death
is not complete without some note of their valuation, both in
the donor's estate and to the donee. We can begin with the
proposition that where the decedent has made a gift later held
to be in contemplation of death, his adjusted gross estate is
determined by including not the value of the gift res when
made, but its value on the date of his death or on the elected
optional valuation date.10  Moreover, if the decedent had re-
linquished a power to alter, amend, or revoke a transfer in con-
templation of death, his adjusted gross estate will include the
whole property subject to the power to the extent it would oth-
erwise be includable under sections 2036, 2037 or 2038 of the
107. Cf. Flick v. Commissioner, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 72 (1948),
where a gift of life insurance in trust was held to have been made in
contemplation of death despite the power given the trustees to surren-
der the insurance policies and use the paid-up portion to invest in
income-producing securities. The court felt that this investment power
was only a "potentiality" and may not have been the dominant purpose
of the donor. However, this case was reversed on appeal. Flick v.
Commissioner, 166 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948).
108. A final distinction can be made, also, among the kinds of life
insurance policies transferred. The donor's objective in transferring an
"endowment" policy might be to save future income taxes (a life mo-
tive), while his transfer of an ordinary life policy would arguably in-
volve the saving of estate taxes (a death motive).
109. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 203(a). Such gifts are simply
treated as if a transfer had never taken place. See Igleheart v. Commis-
sioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935). However, at least one authority
feels that the donor should not be held responsible for fluctuations in
the value of the gift res after transfer and that its value should be pegged
as of the date of gift. See AmiRICAN LAW INsTrTUTE, FEDERAL INCOME,
EsTATE AND GIFT TAX STATUTE 235 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1955).
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Code.110 The ravages of inflation thus work against the unsuc-
cessful donor in these cases. If the subject of the gift has
steeply increased in value during the three-year presumptive pe-
riod of section 2035, the estate must report the increment; where-
as, if a gift tax was paid in the year following transfer, the sec-
tion 2012 gift tax credit may be a less-than-satisfactory offset to
the donor's estate.
On the side of the donee, the basis of the gift res for in-
come tax purposes is the same as his donor's basis when the
gift was made-regardless of its inclusion in the donor's estate."'
And the donee's holding period for capital gains begins on the
date of the gift and not on the date of the donor's death.112 The
donee thus actually pays a penalty where section 2035 is im-
posed; had he inherited the gift res via a bequest or devise, he
would at least have received an improvement in basis.
But suppose the donee, while the donor is still living, has
converted, sold or reinvested the subject given. Will the
avails of such a transaction be included in the donor's estate?
If the donor's gift was of cash, only the cash amount will be
counted. 1 3 If the donor made an outright gift of securities and
the securities were then traded by the donee, presumably trac-
ing principles apply. Yet it has been said that where the gift
subject is stock, post-transfer cash dividends, and their avails,
are not included as part of the estate valuation of the gift.1' 4
Reinvested earnings, adding to the value of the stock trans-
ferred, as well as stock dividends would, however, be added to
the donor's taxable estate for they would be reflected in the date
of death value of the gift res.115 One can see that inconsisten-
cies in treatment abound in this area.
To add to these inconsistencies, there is an apparent dis-
crepancy between the section 2035 taxation of outright lifetime
gifts and taxation of equivalent gifts made in trust. In the case
of gifts in trust, the donor's estate tends to be taxed on the full
increment in value of the trust res between the date of contribu-
110. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(b) (1958).
111. See A. CAsNER, ESTATE PLANNNG-1965 SUPPLEMENT 123 (3d
ed. 1965).
112. Rev. Rul. 59-86, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 209.
113. Id.
114. 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW Or FEDERAL GiFT AND ESTATE TAxAION§ 22.80 (1959).
115. Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949); Delia
Crawford McGehee, 28 T.C. 412 (1957), rev'd, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.
1958). See also O'Malley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ill.
1963), affd, 340 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
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tion and the date of death, regardless of the amount of reinvest-
ing by the trustee. That is, the avails of a gift in contempla-
tion of death made in trust are "locked into" the trust mechanism
and do not spill out into the usual exclusion from estate tax af-
forded untraceable income from an outright gift made under
similar circumstances. In the outright or indefeasible gift situa-
tion, the real "taxable event" is the inter vivos transfer. In
the gift in trust, particularly where the donor has retained any
powers at all, the donor's death is viewed as the "taxable event"
completing the transfer which was begun inter vivos but only
made final and free of all strings at the later time.116 Accumu-
lated, post-gift income will thus be included in the latter instance
but not in the former.
In the several valuation problems just reviewed, one also en-
counters a conceptual divergence between the tax imposed on
the local property law value of the "interest" conveyed in con-
templation of death and the calculated value of the same "in-
terest" were it to have remained in the donor's estate.117 Un-
der local property law valuation principles, if A conveys X stock
to B by inter vivos gift made in contemplation of death, A's
estate would have to include the value of the interest as con-
veyed. However, the "tax" valuation of the same interest would
require its inclusion in' A's estate at the exact amount by which
A's adjusted gross estate has been diminished as a result of the
inter vivos transfer. The courts are even now unsettled as to
which of these valuation principles should prevail.
This difference in valuation theories was dramatically illus-
trated in the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Allen."58
The donor had created an irrevocable trust, reserving to herself
three-fifths of the trust income for life and providing that the
remaining two-fifths income interest vest in two of her children.
Eighteen years later she sold her retained life estate to a third
116. This divergency in tax policy has been criticized by Young,
Proposed Estate Tax Regulations, 95 T. & E. 1080 (1956). See also
Pavenstedt, Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death; A Pro-
posal for Abolition, 54 YALE L.J. 70 (1944). Compare Commissioner v.
Gidwitz, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952), which included in donor's estate
only the exact subject of the indefeasible transfer, with United States
v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), rev'g 340 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1964), in
which the increment or later avails of the donor's gift in trust was also
included. For a more thorough explanation of this divergence in valua-
tion see Lowndes & Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the
Federal Estate Tax, 65 MICH. L. REV. 105, 106 (1966).
117. These two concepts of the "interest" subject to estate tax are
discussed in Comment, 61 MicH. L. R v. 1335 (1963).
118. 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
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child for its then actuarial value at a price far less than the
value of the three-fifths principal interest required to gener-
ate the income. Her death within three years after this "sale"
raised the question of whether the transfer was a "gift" under
section 2035.119 Under local property law concepts the donor
had sold for fair consideration exactly what she owned at the
time of the sale-a three-fifths income interest actuarially valued.
But the court held that an amount equal to three-fifths of the
principal of the trust, less the proceeds received from the sale of
the income interest, should be included in the donor's estate un-
der section 2036 of the Code.120 That is, the court both viewed
and valued the sale of the income interest as if this transaction
pulled the corresponding trust principal along with it-and the
trust principal became equivalent to a gift in contemplation of
death. Thus the donor's "interest" subject to inclusion in her
estate became the so-called "tax" interest-the amount by which
her adjusted gross estate would have been reduced by the trans-
fer, if allowed.
The Allen decision contradicted an earlier holding of the
Ninth Circuit in Sullivan v. Commissioner.'2' There a husband,
expecting imminent death, joined with his wife in conveying
by gift certain jointly-held property to their son. They later
segregated and divided the remainder of their jointly-held
property between themselves as tenants in common. After the
husband's death two months later, the court held that only one-
half of the joint property transferred to the son could be taxed as
property given in contemplation of death because, under appli-
cable local property law, that was the "interest" the husband
actually owned. As to the balance of the property owned in
undivided common interests, only the one-half interest held by
the decedent at death was included in his estate. The court
felt that the transfer of the other one-half common interest from
husband to wife had been bona fide and in return for an ade-
quate consideration-the wife's relinquishment of her former
joint interest.122
119. The federal district court held to this effect. See 60-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 1 11965 (D. Colo. 1960).
120. Section 2036, in effect, pulls back into the donor's estate the
full value of any transfer as to which the donor retains an income
interest ending with his death.
121. 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949), rev'g 10 T.C. 961 (1948).
122. These cases are more fully explained and related in the writer's
article, Joint Tenancy: The Estate Lawyer's Continuing Burden, 64
MxcH. L. REv. 801, 824-27 (1966). See also, as to tenancies by the en-
tirety, A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955).
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The definition of the taxpayer's "interest" conveyed thus is
of vital importance to the practitioner advising a client on sus-
pected contemplation of death transfers. The above examples
show that one rule of valuation obtains in the Tenth Circuit,
another in the Ninth. The law of the locality must also be stud-
ied, for at least four different views affecting valuation are ex-
tant in the 21 state jurisdictions recognizing tenancy by the
entirety.123 The prevalence of joint or entireties ownership be-
tween spouses demands appraisal of the varying approaches of
the Allen and Sullivan cases.
A more specific valuation problem encountered in "contem-
plation of death" assignments of life insurance policies should
be mentioned. Where the donor has assigned all the incidents
of ownership of his policy well in advance of death and, as is
customary, continues to pay the premiums, what effect does his
incremental payment of premiums within the three-year pre-
sumptive period have? Is the whole face value of the policy
pulled back into the donor's estate by virtue of his continuation
of such payments, or a prorated part of the face value, or none of
it? At least one case has suggested inclusion of the policy's
full face value,124 the rationale of such view seeming to be that
continuing premium payments are tantamount to a continuing
gift ended only by death. Other authorities have claimed equally
vociferously that the payment of premiums by a donor long af-
ter an irrevocable transfer of the policies should not be held in
contemplation of death.125 In a recent ruling the Commissioner
has taken the position that premium payments by the donor
within the three-year period require estate inclusion of the pro-
portionate part of the policy's-face value.1 26
One solution would be to require the donee to make the
post-transfer premium payments, or in the case of a funded
insurance trust require that the trustee pay the premiums by
invading corpus if necessary to do so. Even unrestricted gifts
of cash from the donor to the policyowner would be held
"premium payments." The Commissioner's above mentioned rul-
ing could also be circumvented by having the policyowner pay
123. See Comment, supra note 117, at 1349-50.
124. Liebman v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945). See aZso
Mannheimer, Wheeler & Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the
Insured, in NEw YoRK UNVERsIrY SEvENTH INsTiTuTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 247 (1955).
125. See, e.g., Brown & Sherman, Payment of Premiums as Trans-
fers in Contemplation of Death, 101 T. & E. 790 (1962). See also Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(1) (1958).
126. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 52, at 11.
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premiums from policy loans after the transfer. If the jurisdiction
involved should hold that the whole policy be pulled back into
the donor's taxable estate, at least the portion supported by the
owner-beneficiary's payments would seem excludible. The prob-
lem here, as in the preceding discussion of "valuation," is the one
of "identification" of property subject to federal estate tax.1 27
It should be noted that the Commissioner's Ruling is not
being given a very docile judicial reception. In Gorman v. Unit-
ed States,1 28 a federal district court ruled that only the insur-
ance premiums paid by an insured decedent within three years of
his death were subject to inclusion in his gross estate; the court
called the revenue ruling "unfounded" and a futile attempt by
the Service to revive the "premium payment" test of insurance
includibility.
VI. PROCEDURE IN SECTION 2035 CASES
The Internal Revenue Service has indicated that it will not
issue advance rulings on whether a given transfer is in contem-
plation of death. 29 So, for the practitioner expecting a challenge
of any decedent's gift on this point, the compilation of relevant
127. See the excellent article, Lowndes and Stephens, Identifica-
tion of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax, 65 MicH. L. REV. 105,
124 (1966). See also Goodson, Gifts in Contemplation of Death? 103
T. & E. 25 (1964). The case of In re Irenee duPont, 194 A.2d 309 (Del.
Ch. Ct. 1963), is a "storybook" example of a deliberate gift in contem-
plation of death which resulted in estate tax-saving. Two members of
the family of Irenee duPont, serving as court-appointed guardians of the
failing 86-year-old donor, secured Delaware Chancery Court approval
for a gift of securities valued at $36 million. The ward's estate then
amounted to $176 million. To get such approval the proponents of the
transfer successfully pointed out that the gift tax of $21 million on the
transfer would be removed from the ward's estate for tax purposes
(either as having been actually paid or as an estate debt) and also that
the gift tax paid could be a credit against the estate tax if the amount
of the gift should later be included under section 2035. The end result
would be at least a saving of 77 per cent of $21 million-a greater saving
than if no gift had been made at all. Mr. duPont's family successfully
anticipated an estate deduction and an estate tax credit for the same
item!
The same policy will often reap tax benefits where a donor has
made a charitable gift clearly and deliberately in contemplation of
death. If the date-of-death value of the gift is later included in the
donor's estate, the allowable marital deduction is proportionately en-
larged. Because of the completed charitable gift, the gross estate will
still get the same reduction as if the gift had been made in the donor's
will. See Polen, In Contemplation of Death, 104 T. & E. 777, 779 (1965).
128. 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 12,533 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
129. Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 527. See also Rev. Proc.
64-31, 1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 14.
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data on the Federal Estate Tax Return Form 706 is obviously
important.
Page two of the return will reveal facts of the decedent's last
illness, and, if the protection privilege is waived, an examining
agent can be expected to ask for hospital records such as lab-
oratory tests, electrocardiograms, and hospital chart notations.
The agent may also question members of decedent's family as to
his physical and mental health during the three-year period
prior to death. Recipients of gifts may be interrogated. Prior
wills and life insurance applications may be investigated. 130
Even the decedent's attorney may receive inquiry as to dece-
dent's requests during the period, and the attorney's mainte-
nance of an office diary of client visits and their purpose may
be helpful to establish a case for the estate. Certainly, it is
likely that an examiner will review past income tax returns to
see the nature of any medical expense deduction taken. Also,
where the property listed in Schedule G of Form 706 is in excess
of $1,000 in value, the donor's executor must file sworn state-
ments of all facts and circumstances relating to his gift mo-
tives and health condition at the time of the transfer, together
with a copy of the death certificate. 1 31 All these facets of in-
vestigation should be anticipated at the field or office audit level.
Beyond the level of the Internal Revenue Appellate Divi-
sion Conference, trial courts will treat the question of the donor's
intent exclusively as one of fact. Precedents, unless they are
four-square on point, will thus not be controlling. The three-
year rebuttable presumption of section 2035 requires the tax-
payer to bear the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of
the evidence that the transfer was not made in contemplation of
death.23 2 In addition to this advantage, the Commissioner may
avail himself of the general presumption that his determination
is correct.' 3 3 However, "[a] showing of facts sufficient to estab-
lish that the rebuttable presumption is overcome will also usually
overcome the presumption in favor of the correctness of the
Commissioner's determination."' 34
The practitioner reading this imposing array of opposing
130. See Polen, supra note 127.
131. Treas. Reg. § 20.6018-4(g) (1958).
132. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 648 (1939).
133. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Rule 32 of the
U.S. Tax Court imposes a general burden of proof on the petitioner
before that tribunal.
134. 3 J. MERTEs, supra note 114, § 22.75, at 243.
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evidentiary burdens should, of course, take heart in the simple
but real truth that the evidence as to the donor's motives for
the transfer in issue is largely within his control. Self-serving
though they may be, the facts as to motive can be selected and
assembled in the first instance by the estate attorney. The
most informed and the most knowledgeable witnesses will in-
variably be related or partisan to the deceased donor. Even the
supposedly more objective medical evidence as to the donor's
physical and mental state may be withheld on the ground of
privilege. The game, in other words, must be fought out in the
donor's home stadium and largely on his terms. The evidentiary
rules are clear and present for the donor's attorney to scout.
The Commissioner, on the other hand, may have to face support-
ive evidence unknown in advance and thrown into the balance
only after his own trial gauntlet has been flung down.
VII. A VIEW TO THE FUTURE
Both government and private tax attorneys would agree that
any tax provision relying so heavily on subjective evidence as
does section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code is ripe for legisla-
tive improvement. It is little wonder that numerous substitutes
and alternatives have been proposed. These range from merely
extending the presumptive period to far more radical remedies.
One suggestion, authoritatively supported, is that the three-year
rebuttable presumption be extended to five years.13 5 Another
would provide for a conclusive two-year presumption if the
donor had reached a specified minimum age and had made a
transfer of a substantial part of his property to the natural ob-
jects of his bounty. 36 A third would impose the test that if a
reasonably prudent man in the donor's position would have
realized that he had no substantial life expectancy at the time
of his gift, the gift would be pulled back into his taxable estate. 37
A fourth would merge all estate and gift taxation, integrating
gift and estate taxes under a single transfer tax with a continuing
exemption usable during life, and the residue of the exemption
used up at death. 38 Finally, the English system of taxing to
the estate any transfer inter vivos made up to five years prior
135. See AMERICAx LAw INSTiTUT, FEDERAL INcomE, ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX STATUTE 97 (Tent. Draft. No. 9, 1954).
136. R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G=r2 TAXATION § 6.26 (1942).
137. See Lowndes & Rutledge, An Objective Test of Transfers in
Contemplation of Death, 24 TExAS L. REv. 134 (1945).
138. See Barry, The Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of
Death, 10 HASTINGs L.J. 370, 382 (1959).
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to the donor's death has been endorsed. The amount of gift res
included in the donor's estate would be prorated, however, ac-
cording to the length of time the donor survives the gift.1 9
Those who have sought in this article a new and original
solution to either the planning or the enforcement of gifts made
in contemplation of death will have to quaff their disappoint-
ment. The writer's purpose has been to show the practicing
attorney the nature of present enforcement and how best to
meet it for planning purposes. If attorneys are made conscious
of the limits of what can be done in this area the amount of
litigation in section 2035 cases will undoubtedly diminish. And
if the amount of litigation diminishes, the need for a drastic
revision of this section of the Code can abate until such time as
an over-all revamping of the American system of estate and gift
tax laws can be maturely considered. 40 There are enough in-
consistencies in the enforcement of section 2035 already to war-
rant a reappraisal rather than patchwork repair of estate tax
philosophy regarding this and other sections. In the meantime
the role of the alert and informed estate planning counselor is a
worthy and vital one.
139. See 11 VILL. L. REV. 814 passim (1966).
140. Such a re-vamping appears to be looming in the form of the
third draft of the AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTES, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAX PROJECT (April 30, 1968).
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